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Abstracts 
 
This paper aims to explore the relevance of the Theory of Argumentation TA in the complex 
area of financial reporting. Specifically, we investigated the scope of the phenomenon of 
persuasion in advertising. It examines advertisements in publications notable economic 
movement in Colombia. The financial communication is important to distinguish how to run the 
models of behavior based on beliefs of agents. Consequently, investors' beliefs can also change 
systematically with changes in market prices. This paper is the first part and its purpose is to 
prepare from the Theory of Argumentation TA an application to the financial sector in 
Colombia. 
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1. Introduction 
Persuasion is part of the broad field of the Theory of Argumentation, TA (Bondarenko, 
Dung, Kowalski, Toni, 1997). In the model presented by these authors a hypothesis can 
be defeated (or attacked) if it can be demonstrated that the opposite is more consistency. 
This phenomenon responds to reasonable dispute that must exist between different 
views about a particular problem. More concisely, TA is an extension to the classical 
and modern conception of rhetoric Aristotle / (Perelman, which comes from the 
semantic and nonmonotonic logic, and extends to the accession of arguments in logic 
programming and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Persuasion suggests a set of hypotheses 
that adheres to an auditorium capable of confronting conflicting positions. In short, the 
theory of argumentation is a variant of the pragmatic applied to various fields of social 
sciences: business, advertising, political campaigns, religious sects and media. 
 
In the dynamics of paramount importance is persuasive message effectiveness but, what 
is a persuasive argument? This article compares conventional models of persuasion 
associated with different audiences (Bench-Capon, Doutre, Dunne, 2007). Remember, 
Perelman (1989) is a persuasive argument the audience always adhere to the 
assumptions that are submitted. In the process of persuasion he informs the audience 
with objective information. Stigler (1961), the information must have relevance and 
utility. Stigler persuasion relates the available information on the quality of 
commodities (Stigler, 1987, p. 243). In these cases, the behavior of audience and 
persuasion may vary depend on reliable beliefs. Certainly, the nature of a product can be 
altered with the beliefs of consumers, i.e., there are biases in the advertising of a 
product; propaganda can be rooted in beliefs that are not true. Moreover, unlike the 
rational argument against qualified audiences, Perelman (1980) argues that the 
propaganda is not seeking to convince the audience about the error of your beliefs, but 
take advantage of them to advantage
1
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This paper aims to explore the relevance of the Theory of Argumentation TA in the 
complex area of financial reporting. Specifically, we investigated the scope of the 
phenomenon of persuasion in advertising. It examines advertisements in publications 
notable economic movement in Colombia. The financial disclosure is important to 
distinguish how to run the models of behavior based on beliefs of agents. Consequently, 
investors' beliefs can also change systematically with changes in market prices. 
The line of analysis proposed is as follows. Section 2 describes, in general, core 
materials for the state of the problem. Session 2 summarizes the main differences with 
the traditional rhetoric of persuasion and its effects on the behavior of agents. Later, 
section 3 processes the data of financial reporting in Colombia and the perception of 
investors. Section 4, describes a basic model that allows the proposition of hypotheses 
on the content of financial advertising over the course of changes in dollar prices. 
Sections 5 and 6 contain some empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis. Section 7 
presents some conclusions. 
With this delivery we deal only sessions 1 and 2. Consequently, the aim is to give a 
theoretical framework from the Theory of Argumentation TA. The hypothesis is that 
financial markets run, taking into account variations in the beliefs of agents. Investors 
do not behave as rational agents. By contrast, economic decisions are in most cases the 
result of irrational intuitions. The financial disclosure is essential. And in this sense, 
persuasion and the media play an outstanding role. 
  
2. Financial Advertising and persuasion 
 
According to Mullainathan, Shleifer (2005), investors have two systems of beliefs about 
their investments: growth and protection. In the first instance seek to accumulate more 
wealth. The second is aimed at ensuring the future. When stock prices are rising, the 
                                                             
1 Bayesian models tend to correct deviations. If people are unsure of the sources in the market, often 
appeal to trustworthy experts that also match their priorities. The advertisement is based on some expert 
audiences can quickly modify their beliefs. Moreover, those campaigns have produced flexible targets 
should vary according to consumer behavior (Kahneman / Tversky, 1973) 
beliefs of the actors to move towards growth, when prices fall, beliefs tend to reinforce 
beliefs about protection. In our view, investor behavior and changes in its expectations 
will depend crucially on the trends found in financial advertising and persuasion in the 
markets. Moreover, the conventional theory of financial supports their predictions in the 
utility objective risk and information found in the rate of return. Our work will attempt 
to verify whether this hypothesis is sufficient empirical support in the financial system 
in Colombia. 
Investigations on the Theory of Argumentation TA with specific applications in 
Colombia are relatively low (Estrada, 2005, 2007, 2008) and in the general literature 
there are few studies that have been developed (Dascal, 2003). Although early are 
intuitive nature Tullock (1967). Posner (1995) makes a distinction between persuasion 
and information from the classical tradition. Recent analysis hatred (Glaeser, 2005), 
mass media (Mullinathan, Shleifer 2005). Shapiro studied persuasion in politics (2005), 
especially in the presentation of models in marketing and advertising campaigns. 
Laibson (2005) extends the analysis to the links between consumer products and key 
psychological effects. Undoubtedly, the analysis of financial markets requires an 
extension notice the advantages of analysis proposed by the Theory of Argumentation 
TA. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the focus of this paper complements the earlier analysis and 
highlights the contributions found in the analytical tradition. Significantly, our findings 
may offer novel approach in psychology of preferences for financial markets. For 
example, describe how changes in the designation of investment funds have an 
important influence on business. Political news may trigger expectations in 
consumption or investment. However, these expectations and their effects are relatively 
quickly vanishing. Found that when a fund changes its name, becoming popular, receive 
greater influx of investors. That is, the advertising campaign for companies to gain 
visibility on the Internet, affirmative effects. In particular, the authors sustain that 
financial advertising is often incompatible with the standard of rationality of the 
investors. In other words, analysts controvert advertising because, they say, leads to 
miscalculation.  
 
The celebrated work of Nassim Nicholas Taleb: The Black Swan (2007) has presented 
an explanation of the limited features of rationality in financial markets. The appearance 
of black swans is not a regular occurrence in business, certainly, but when present, 
variable conditions of nature unleashed on the beliefs of agents. Taleb calls this 
phenomenon the triplet of opacity: 
  
 
1. The illusion of understanding, or how we all think we know what happens in 
a world that is more complicated (or random) than we think. 
 
2. The hindsight bias, or how we test things only after the fact, as if reflected in 
a mirror (history seems clearer and more organized in books than in empirical 
reality) and 
 
3. The overstatement of factual information and the disadvantage of those 
scholarly and authoritative, especially when they create categories, when 
"platonifican”2. 
 
 
The three components relate to the feeling that they have investors. However, 
conventional tradition takes opposite conditions. That is, markets have no place of 
doubt, but certainty. The beliefs of intermediaries play in a world of Cartesian 
geometry. The explanations of market failures are more reasonable when people have 
lost their investment. Finally, an over-reliance on data and ability of the professionals is 
the best choice for the general collapse. 
 In this research there is a significant body of materials that check the changing trend of 
investors (Delong et al. 1990, Barberis, Shleifer and Vihny, 1998). It has been found 
that investors extrapolate the past, following proven earlier styles by themselves or their 
closest (Barberis and Shleifer, 2005). In practical terms, means that investors found a 
positive relationship between the later stages of the cash flows on their earlier states 
(Chevalier and Ellison 1997, Sirri and Tufano 1998). Summarizing the analytic version 
accepted that all beliefs have a progressive role, however, stressed that the 
                                                             
2
 Taleb extends the influence of a skeptical tradition that comes from Sextus Empiricus and has reach 
critical Montaigne, Hume, Popper and Benoit Mandelbrot (Taleb, 2007) 
persuasiveness of a message depends on the variations on the set of beliefs. In 
summary, to make greater persuasive force in financial markets should see the 
conditions under which change the beliefs of their agents. 
 A key issue, the contents of the persuasive arguments have in mind that advertisers, 
such as business, maximize profits, and choose the messages that may have an impact 
on consumers. There is no presumption that firms behave like animals or are vulnerable 
to sustain advertising messages that do not reach the people. Nor is that advertising has 
purely practical interest (Jain and Wu (2000) or are only related to disclosure. The 
financial advertising is effective when there is a greater influx to the funds. In sum, the 
argumentative approach is related to the effectiveness of persuasion in the conduct of 
professional investors. 
  
3. Biases of information and markets 
In the classical theory of the market, since the time of Smith or Ricardo, persuasion 
objectively communicates valuable information about the characteristics of the 
products. That is, consumers use these facts to update their beliefs, compare the value of 
the goods and decide whether to buy. In addition, consumers do not have direct access 
to the causal chain of the original prices, so give confidence to the information provider 
provides them. In the market sellers have information that can engage the buyers to 
make right decisions under (Akerlof, 1970, Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
  
Question; what does this with respect to financial advertising? First, it suggests that 
advertisers should give information on options and possible benefits of investors as 
pointed out in Stigler. Second, mutual funds rarely updated, because the returns are not 
repeated. Upgrades when the returns, they tend to be relative. Third, mutual funds must 
give information on risks. And finally, the tradition suggests that these data should be 
included in financial advertising. As we see and Shleifer, Mullainathan, a fund that does 
not show the relative rate of return is a bad player on the market, a fund that does not 
show its revenue is implying expansive character and nature
3
.  
                                                             
3 Just spending money on advertising constitutes relevant information as they reflect signs of confidence 
and profitability by the advertiser (Nelson, 1970). Although these authors' models of persuasion. As also 
 Get different types depending on the forecasting models. There are different forms of 
persuasion. In general, the models emphasize the importance of cognitive and emotional 
response to the messages presented (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). As a result, people 
often ignore relevant data and process data and information with Bayesian logic. A 
seller can pass incomplete information persuasive showing no interest in the 
consequences of the decisions people take. As Schopenhauer wrote: “a persuasive 
process can be effective without the information provided is true” (for fas and nefas). 
Or you can find opinion polls that show emotional states affected by biased information 
(Carpenter, et. al., 1994). 
 
In addition, in psychology of preferences, research suggests particular structures on 
processes of persuasion. And in these cases are persuasive speeches of a speaker that 
affect the feelings and beliefs. To illustrate, the study of Mullainathan and Shleifer 
(2005) summarizes a much body of research on the psychology of collective 
preferences, beliefs about what people value and enjoy, shared message content. 
Information biases beliefs are important. First, as described by Dorothy Graber (1984) 
people often ignore those messages incompatible with their own views. To make impact 
an agent must adapt their arguments to the prevailing beliefs of the audience (Perelman, 
1957). Second, research data show that people tend to believe little data inconsistent 
with their beliefs (Lord, Ross and Lapper, 1979, Zaller, 1992, Rabin Schrag, 1999). 
Third, people seek information that confirms preferably priorities (Klayman, 1995). 
 
Again, there is another way to illustrate the relationship between persuasion and 
collective behavior. Human beings represent the world through a system of related 
associations (Gilovich, 1981). These mental maps provide both a representation of their 
experiences and beliefs. That is, a persuasive message is connected to a product 
resulting from prevailing associations. The difference between approaches with the 
conventional interpretation is clearer with the famous advertising campaigns. Now, the 
outstanding success of corporate campaigns is due, among other reasons, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
described by Taleb (2007), predictions are sometimes incompatible with the systematic variation of the 
content on the beliefs of the agents involved. 
combination of humor and the need to secure savings deposits. By contrast, everyday 
life situations where people choose the wrong place are shown as a counterexample to 
the person who makes good decisions. O American Express has sold millions of dollars 
to their passengers through the idea of taking the precautions most promising 
investment. In the distance, the image of freedom of the hostages in Colombia, such as, 
opens a huge market of advertising associated with greater stability for the evolution of 
the economy. 
However, what degree of generality and extent are these examples? In this paper we 
suggest an affirmative answer to study financial advertising. The case is attractive for 
several reasons. The financial disclosure is proper to check theoretically the behavior of 
investors, their beliefs, and the changes that occur in response to changes in market 
context. Furthermore, models of behavior based on persuasive information content vary 
with changes in investor behavior and attention to the prevailing beliefs. Moreover, 
financial advertising exposes components that respond to the need to get information to 
make immediate decisions when you do not have too much time. In short, analysis is 
needed to integrate both the empirical dynamics of markets and the observation of cases 
in a given time. 
  
To guess what type of conduct may be taken by people, we develop hypotheses about 
their beliefs and changing their behavior over time. In general, operators have different 
issues in mind when investing. Different belief systems may conflict. These systems can 
be described as factors of investment (a way to earn money) and protection (a way to 
make sure its future). The growth is associated with increasing wealth, independence 
and freedom to do what you want. The protection is related to security, risk prevention 
against poverty and adversity. Both factors are closely linked to emotional states such as 
greed and fear experienced by humans. 
And in these cases, a persuasive speech mobilizes a set of beliefs of agents in a given 
time (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). When the seller investment privileges, and relates 
more income, persuasive communication will fall on growth when there is an 
atmosphere of uncertainty on investment, sellers favor, over another resource-
protection. The bubbles on the Internet give a privileged illustrative material. Precisely 
because of the flexible nature of belief systems took over a decade. Indeed, in the stock 
market prices rose and the system of investors' beliefs evolved from the conviction of 
growth. Conversely, when prices fell in 2001, beliefs moved in another direction, 
towards the protection. Then it is possible to guess the hypotheses on changes in the 
content of persuasive messages according to the growth or decline of the markets.  
 
Conclusion 
Financial markets do not work with perfect rationality rules. On the contrary, the 
financial markets have an image resembling “equilibrium in the jungle” 
(Pissione/Rubinstein, 2007). Furthermore, financial markets use daily with biased 
information and asymmetric information. In the first case, through the intervention of 
those privileged information obtained in anticipation of others. In the second case, 
financial markets distributed power inequity. 
The information is relevant to understanding financial markets. But the information is 
processed and communicated in the computer networks that make up the nervous 
system of the economy is not just information. The data and financial information 
depends on the person and collective beliefs. Therefore, the beliefs of financial agents 
find the so-called information bias (and vice versa). That is, when information is 
distributed in the markets through advertising, communication becomes persuasive.  
 
Indeed, financial markets express the benefits of communication with some agents over 
others. Persuasion can be effective, although it is not true. This means, the information 
in the financial markets depends on the behavior of agents. Therefore, the financial 
information may or may not have the same persuasive force. 
In this context it is important to the Theory of Argumentation TA. You can help us 
understand how some agents influencing the financial markets. In addition, persuasion 
has a variable force. Financial agents (intermediaries, investors and experts) make 
decisions that depend on information processing. That is, information that circulates in 
the mass media and specialized magazines. An explanation of the financial markets 
requires analysis of human behavior, beliefs and the nature of the information it holds. 
Briefly, The Theory of Argumentation TA incorporates these aspects of economic 
psychology, within an analytical framework with practical significance. 
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